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Abstract 
Japan’s commitments to the UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor were the largest 
contribution the country has made in the history of its international peace operations. 
Notably, Japan’s participation in the peacebuilding operations in East Timor was based on 
“human security” as one of the pillars of its diplomatic policy. Moreover, Japan’s 
participation in the peace operations in East Timor was a touchstone issue for its human 
security policy. Yet, one simple but important question arises. How consistent were Japan’s 
commitments to the peace operations? In an attempt to answer to this question, this paper 
systematically examines Japan’s contributions to the international peace operations for East 
Timor. In order to investigate long-term and complicated activities in the peace operations, 
this paper employs timeline “sequence analysis” as a research method which combines and 
simplifies analytical models suggested in earlier scholarship. Through the application of 
sequence analysis, this paper investigates four stages of Japan’s contributions to the peace 
operations in East Timor: 1) preventive deployment (UNAMET), 2) peace-enforcement 
(INTERFET), 3) peacekeeping (UNTAET), and 4) peacebuilding (e.g. UNMISET). The 
findings of this research reveal to what extent Japan’s commitments to the peace operations 
were consistent and for human security of East Timor. 
Introduction 
During the Cold War period, Japan was unable to participate in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) because of its post-war anti-militarist pacifism, based on 
its Peace Constitution. However, the Japanese government enacted the International Peace 
Cooperation Law (PKO Law) in order to dispatch the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992. Japan’s participation 
in UNTAC was a turning-point for Japan’s peacekeeping operations (PKO) policy. In order 
to participate in UNPKOs, Japan’s pacifism shifted from one-nation pacifism constrained by 
Article 9 of its Constitution to international pacifism based on the Preamble of the 
Constitution (Akimoto, 2012; Ishizuka, 2005). During the 1990s, Japanese peacekeepers were 
dispatched to the following UN peacekeeping operations and other humanitarian operations: 
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Mozambique (1993), El Salvador (1994), the Congo (1994), the Golan Heights (1995, 1996), 
Bosnia (1998), and Kosovo (1999) (Cabinet Office Japan, 2012). 
In this context, the Japanese government attempted to make a greater contribution to 
UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor based on the concept of “human security” as 
one of the pillars of its foreign policy (Nasukawa, 2010), which  “emerged as a tool for 
coordinating various activities of international aid and peace operations” (Shinoda, 2004, p. 
1). Notably, as Gen Kikkawa (2007, p.  248) observed, Japan’s participation in the peace 
operations in East Timor was “the first test case of Japan’s human security policy”. 
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that military and constitutional limitations of Japan’s 
peace operations are obvious because “Japan avoids genuine risks for peace by not 
dispatching adequate manpower” (Lam, 2012, p. 193). Here, one simple but significant 
research question immediately arises. To what extent were Japan’s peace operations in East 
Timor consistent despite its military and constitutional constraints? 
The purpose of this paper is to answer to this research question by systematically 
examining Japan’s contributions to the international peace operations in East Timor. To this 
end, this study employs timeline “sequence analysis” as a research method, which combines 
and simplifies analytical models suggested in earlier scholarship. Through the application of 
sequence analysis, this paper investigates four stages of Japan’s commitments to the peace 
operations in East Timor: 1) preventive deployment (UNAMET), 2) peace-enforcement 
(INTERFET), 3) peacekeeping (UNTAET), and 4) peacebuilding (e.g. UNMISET). Finally, 
examined research data will be provided after the analysis of the four periods in order to 
visualise and evaluate the sequence of Japan’s peace operations for human security of East 
Timor. 
Methodology 
UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor were comprehensive, and can be 
divided into four major stages, as observed by Juichi Inada (2004, p. 229). This research 
utilizes this classification to conduct “sequence analysis” of the four periods. First, the United 
Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), led-by Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG) Ian Martin, was established on 11 June 1999 in order to observe the national 
referendum. Second, the Australian- led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), 
under the command of Major General Peter Cosgrove, was initiated on 15 September 1999 as 
a peace-enforcement operation authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
Third, as a peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
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Timor (UNTAET) led by SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello was set up on 25 October 1999. 
Fourth, as a post- independence peacebuilding operation, the United Nations Mission of 
Support to East Timor (UNMISET), under the leadership of Japanese SRSG Sukehiko 
Hasegawa, was organized on 20 May 2002. 
Simply put, the peace operations in East Timor consists of four phases as follows: 1) 
preventive diplomacy (UNAMET as a preventive deployment), 2) peacemaking (INTERFET 
as peace-enforcement), 3) peacekeeping (UNTAET), and 4) post-conflict peacebuilding 
(UNMISET), as advocated by former United Nations Secretary General Boutros B. Ghali 
(1992) in his essay, An Agenda For Peace. 
Strictly speaking, however, Ghali (1992) proposed “preventive diplomacy” as a 
peaceful action before conflict arises. Still, UNAMET can be categorized as preventive 
diplomacy in that it was a “preventive deployment”, aiming to prevent conflict from 
spreading during the ballot. INTERFET was not a UN force or UN-led peace enforcement 
unit, but rather a multinational force authorized by a UN resolution. Nonetheless, it can be 
categorized as UN-authorized “peace-enforcement” part of the “peacemaking” process. 
UNTAET was established based on Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, but in 
reality, this peace operation was a UNTAC-type “peacekeeping” operation. UNMISET and 
the peace operations which followed can be categorized as post-conflict “peacebuilding”. 
During the four periods, Japan made substantial contributions to the peace operations in East 
Timor by dispatching civilian police to UNAMET in 1999, donating US$100 million to 
INTERFET, sending civilian electoral monitors to UNTAET in 2001, and deploying 
peacekeepers to UNTAET and UNMISET in 2002 (Cabinet Office Japan 2002-2004). 
Needless to say, previous research has developed and employed sophisticated timeline 
conflict analysis methods, such as “conflict escalation and de-escalation” to clarify nine 
stages of conflict (Glasl, 1982), “progression of conflict” (Lederach, 1995), “conflict life-
cycles” to analyse the birth/genesis, maturation/dynamics, death/solution of conflict (Galtung, 
1996), the “life history of conflict” illustrated as a bell shaped curve (Lund, 1996), and the 
“hourglass model” to investigate conflict containment, conflict settlement, and conflict 
transformation (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005). In the examination of 
international peace operations, some researchers have focused on peacekeeping operations 
and other analysts have emphasized the significance of peacebuilding activities (Paris & Sisk, 
2009; Francis, 2010). The earlier works provided applicable conflict analysis models and in-
depth investigations, but they are methodologically different from analyst to ana lyst. 
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In contrast, this study integrates the analytical frameworks employed by the earlier 
studies and simplifies them as a “sequence analysis method”. Normally, the term “sequence 
analysis” is employed in the field of natural science, especially in genetics for the analysis of 
a DNA sequence (Margulies & Birney, 2008). However, a timeline-based sequence analysis 
can be applicable to political science (Fenno, 1986; Pierson, 2004), social science (Abbott, 
1995), economics (Kanai, 2002), conflict analysis (Gottman, Markman, & Notarius, 1977), 
and peacekeeping operations (Akimoto, 2012). The previous works in various academic 
fields employed the sequential analysis in different ways, but they indicate that it is possible 
to introduce the sequence analysis method into the field of peace and conflict studies. The 
sequence analysis method in this paper examines the “four stages” of peace operations (1. 
preventive deployment, 2. peace-enforcement, 3. peacekeeping, and 4. peacebuilding), 
followed by analysed and visualised research data. The simple sequence of peace operations 
in East Timor can be shown in Table 1 below.  
Table1: Sequence of Four Stages of Peace Operations in East Timor 
Year Month Stage of Peace Operations Name of  Peace Operations 
1999 June 1. Preventive diplomacy UNAMET set up (preventive deployment)  
1999 August 1. Preventive diplomacy Ballot conducted (cause of violent conflict) 
1999 September 2. Peacemaking INTERFET operated (peace-enforcement) 
1999 October 3. Peacekeeping UNTAET established (pre-independence) 
2002 May 4. Peacebuilding UNMISET, etc. (post-independence) 
Note: For a detailed sequence analysis of the peace operations, see Table 2. 
 
In order to apply the sequence analysis method, this paper investigates the data from 
the Cabinet Office Japan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), and the United 
Nations as primary sources. The in-depth sequence analysis of the primary sources will assist 
in filling a gap in the earlier research regarding Japan’s contributions to international peace 
missions in East Timor (e.g. Gorjao, 2002; Inada, Yoshida, & Isezaki, 2003; Inada, 2004; 
Walton, 2004; Kikkawa, 2007; Llewelyn, Walton, & Kikkawa, 2009; Lam, 2012) and 
answering to the core research question: to what extent Japan’s peace operations were 
consistent and comprehensive for human security of East Timor.  
Findings  
Stage 1: Preventive Deployment: Japan’s Contribution to UNAMET 
As an analysis of the first stage of the peace operations, Japan’s contribution to 
“preventive diplomacy” for East Timor, will be overviewed in this section. From the 
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perspective of a sequence analysis of international peace operations, UNAMET can be 
categorized as a “preventive deployment” for independence. Normally, preventive diplomacy 
is considered the prevention of conflict, and conflict already existed between East Timor and 
Indonesia. Still, UNAMET was a UN peace operation to prevent violence during the 
referendum period. In spite of the operation’s peaceful nature, Japan did not dispatch the SDF 
and reluctantly sent three civilian police officers. On 5 May 1999, Indonesia and Portugal 
signed an agreement to resolve conflict over East Timor. An agreement was also reached on a 
“direct, secret, and universal ballot” to determine the future of East Timor and to set up an 
appropriate United Nations mission to oversee the process. On 11 June 1999, the UNSC 
adopted Resolution 1246 to establish UNAMET (United Nations, 2001a). 
In response to requests from the United Nations, the Japanese government decided to 
dispatch a political affairs officer and three civilian police officers from July 1999. In 
addition, Japan contributed US$10.11 million to the UN Trust Fund, and provided 2,000 
radios (MOFA, 1999a). As for the significance of Japan’s material contribution to UNAMET, 
Ian Martin noted that “Asia’s economic collapse was UNAMET’s good fortune: stocks of 
vehicles were available to be flown to East Timor from Tokyo” (Martin, 2001, p. 39). Due to 
the death of police officer Haruyuki Takada during the UNTAC operation in Cambodia, a 
cautious debate took place in Tokyo when three civilian police officers were dispatched to 
East Timor (National Diet Library, 1999). In spite of the small number of participants, Japan 
was recognized as a “major contributor to the voluntary funding of UNAMET” (Martin & 
Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, 130). 
Ironically, the ballot in East Timor turned out to be a cause of conflict despite the 
peace operation as a preventive measure. According to UNAMET, as many as 446,666 East 
Timorese people registered for the ballot. The direct ballot in East Timor was carried out on 
30 August 1999 and 98.6% of registered voters participated in the process. The result of the 
vote was that 78.5% of voters rejected the proposed plan for special autonomy and 21.5% 
voted in favour of being governed by the special authority of the Indonesian government 
(United Nations, 2001b, 2001c; Martin, 2001, pp. 60, 90, 94). Immediately after the result of 
the ballot was announced, however, anti- independence (pro- integration) groups burned down 
houses and killed people. UNAMET spokesman David Wimhurst pointed out that UNAMET 
was “defenceless” because “UNAMET had always been an unarmed mission and that 
security had always been the province of the Indonesian authorities” (United Nations, 1999b). 
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By 5 September, as many as 150,000 people, one-quarter of the entire population, had 
become refugees due to the violence and destruction. At this stage, 1,200 members of the 
Australian Defense Forces began implementing military drills near Darwin in anticipation of 
the UNSC adopting a resolution to authorize the armed intervention of multinational forces 
(Ishizuka, 2008, pp. 121-122). Gross human rights violations, including the indiscriminate 
killing of women and children, were conducted across East Timor in September. In addition, 
as many as 70% of the buildings (90% in Dili) were destroyed and approximately 270,000 
people, one-third of the entire population, became refugees (Takahashi, Masuoka, & Monju, 
2000, pp. 7-10, 13-20). UNAMET was able to hold the ballot but it could not prevent “crimes 
against humanity”, and major cities in East Timor became “killing fields” (Dunn, 2001). 
These mass killings and “human insecurity” (Umegaki, Thiesmeyer, & Watanbe, 2009) in 
East Timor were beyond the mandate of UNAMET and necessitated military intervention by 
INTERFET. 
Stage 2: Peace-enforcement: Japan’s Financial Contribution to INTERFET 
In the second stage of the peace operation (peacemaking/peace-enforcement), it is 
clarified that Japan made a financial contribution to INTERFET as a peace-enforcement 
operation in East Timor. On 15 September, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1264, recognising 
the security situation in East Timor as a threat to peace and security. The resolution 
authorized the establishment of a multinational force (United Nations, 1999a). INTERFET 
was established to “restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and support UNAMET 
in carrying out its task (and within force capabilities) and to facilitate humanitarian assistance 
operations” (Cobb, 1999). It is noteworthy that Resolution 1264 legitimatized the use of 
force, stipulating “all necessary measures to fulfil [its] mandate” (Ibid). 
The approximate number of the “coalitions of the willing” soldiers was 13,000, 
comprising troops from Brazil, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the 
United States, and Australia (Dee, 2001, p. 1). The mission of INTERFET troops was to 
crack down on and disarm the East Timorese militia, which had been created by the 
Indonesian army (Isezaki, 2004, pp. 64-65). In this sense, the INTERFET mission was more 
difficult to carry out than other UN peace operations.  
Predictably, Sadaaki Numata, the MOFA Press Secretary, was vague on the issue of 
dispatching the SDF to INTERFET, stating that “I think it is a bit premature for me to go 
further into the details of what sort of possible participation there might be in the United 
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Nations Peacekeeping Forces” (MOFA, 1999b). It is plausible that Numata avoided 
mentioning a SDF dispatch to INTERFET because of Japan’s constitutional restraints. The 
dispatch of the SDF to multinational military operations was technically impossible, and 
therefore, the Japanese government decided to support the launch of INTERFET by 
financially providing a fund of US$100 million. Notably, the entire contribution to the 
INTERFET Trust Fund was US$107 million (Dee, 2001, p. 10; McDermott, 1999). 
In response to the worsening security situation in East Timor, the Japanese 
government decided to contribute an additional US$2 million as an emergency assistance 
fund. One million dollars was donated to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and another million was contributed to the World Food Programme (WFP) 
(MOFA, 1999c). This immediate response from Japan indicates that the Japanese government 
believed that it was constitutionally impossible to dispatch the SDF to join a multinational 
force. At a press conference, the MOFA Press Secretary rejected the possibility of a dispatch 
of the SDF to INTERFET on the grounds of a lack of legal framework (MOFA, 1999d). 
To make contributions to UN peace operations in East Timor, the Japanese 
government started to reconsider its conventional PKO policy. These decisions by the 
Japanese government regarding a non-military contribution to the security crisis of post-
ballot East Timor were made based on the PKO Law. While making decisions on 
humanitarian aid, the Japanese government attempted to lift the freeze on peacekeeping 
forces (PKF) operations. In this context, the LDP, the Liberal Party, and Komeito signed the 
“Three-Party Accord” on 4 October 1999 (Shoji, 2005). On 14 October, the Japanese 
government announced plans to dispatch a field study mission, made up of officials from the 
Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, the Prime Minister’s Office, 
MOFA, and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to East Timor. The Japanese government 
hoped to contribute towards the transportation of UNHCR goods by plane through 150 staff 
of the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) (MOFA, 1999e). Based on the PKO Law, the 
government contributed assistance goods, such as 500 tents, 9,000 blankets, 11,140 sleeping 
mats, 20,000 water containers, and 5,120 plastic sheets for the displaced East Timorese 
(MOFA, 1999f). In response to a request from UNHCR, the Japanese government also 
decided to dispatch four aircraft (C-130H) as transport planes for the ASDF and a multi-
purpose assistance plane (U-4) with six liaison officers between Surabaya (Java Island) and 
Kupang (West Timor) (MOFA, 1999g). In addition to the material assistance, the Japanese 
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government contributed US$100 million to the UN Trust Fund, and the government, 
moreover, explored options to dispatch the SDF to East Timor in post-INTERFET operations. 
Stage 3: Peacekeeping: Japan’s Incremental Contribution to UNTAET 
In the third stage of the peace operation (peacekeeping), Japan’s contribution became 
gradually active, and finally, Japanese peacekeepers were dispatched to UNTAET. The 
mandate of the UNTAET operation was based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which 
includes “peace-enforcement”. Yet, the UNTAET operation can be categorized as an 
UNTAC-type peacekeeping operation. Although the nature of UNTAET was peacekeeping 
rather than coercive action, Japan could not at first deploy the SDF to UNTAET due to 
constitutional constraints. Instead, Japan dispatched the SDF to Indonesia and West Timor to 
support UNHCR for the relief of East Timorese IDP during this period. On 20 October 1999, 
the Indonesian government decided to withdraw from East Timor and the UNSC set up 
UNTAET based on Resolution 1272, which was adopted on 25 October 1999 (United 
Nations, 1999c, 2001d). 
The word “Timorization” became a slogan to empower East Timor and the nation-
building process, and was also part of a process of “democratization” (Isezaki, 2004, p. 46). 
UNTAET was composed of three pillars: the military, Humanitarian Assistance and 
Emergency Rehabilitation (HAER), and Governance and Public Administration. HAER was 
conducted under the leadership of Akira Takahashi, who later became Special Adviser on 
Development and Humanitarian Affairs to the SRSG. HAER was “instrumental in 
coordinating a range of relief and humanitarian organizations and working with the East 
Timorese to determine relief assistance priorities” (Smith & Dee, 2003, pp. 62-63). Unlike 
PKF activities, humanitarian assistance is an area to which Japanese peacekeepers could 
make a substantial contribution. Takahashi’s leadership in HAER assisted Japan’s 
contribution in the field of humanitarian aid.  
On 26 October 1999, MOFA Press Secretary Numata announced that Japan was 
willing to make a contribution to UNTAET in response to the adoption of UNSC Resolution 
1272, although he did not mention the possibility of the dispatch of the SDF to UNTAET 
(MOFA, 1999h). Akira Takahashi, Special Advisor to the President of the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), was appointed by the UN Secretary General as the Deputy 
Special Representative of the Secretary General for Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency 
Rehabilitation of UNTAET (MOFA, 1999i). Takeshi Kamiyama, a MOFA official, was 
appointed as a senior civil affairs officer to take charge of the Environmental Protection Unit 
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of the Governance and Public Administration Component of UNTAET (MOFA, 2000). 
These appointments of Japanese officials to pivotal positions in UNTAET reflected MOFA’s 
diplomatic efforts to make a contribution to peace operations in East Timor.  
On 19 November 1999, in response to a request from UNHCR, the Japanese 
government decided to dispatch 113 ASDF members to Indonesia and West Timor (Kupang) 
to transport aid materials. The ASDF left from the Komaki base and transported 400 tons of 
material, and UNHCR appreciated Japan’s participation, which made it possible to provide 
aid for 120,000 East Timorese refugees (JDA, 2000, pp. 175-176). Yoshio Mochizuki, a 
Parliamentary Secretary for MOFA, visited East Timor on 11 April 2001 to meet the leaders 
of East Timor, including President Xanana Gusmao and Vice-President Jose Ramos-Horta. In 
these meetings, Mochizuki emphasized Japan’s contribution in the three fields of agriculture, 
human resources development, and infrastructure (MOFA, 2001a). The dispatch of ASDF 
personnel to Indonesia and West Timor and Mochizuki’s visit to East Timor show the non-
military and indirect nature of Japan’s contribution to the UNTAET operation.  
In response to a request from the United Nations, the Japanese government dispatched 
19 civilian election observers to the Constituent Assembly of East Timor based on the PKO 
Law (MOFA, 2001b). With regard to the election, the Japanese government decided to make 
an extra emergency contribution of US$1,191,000 through the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) (MOFA, 2001c). On 30 August 2001, Constituent Assembly Elections 
were held with a voter turnout rate of 91.3%. 88 Assembly members were elected as part of a 
peaceful democratic process (MOFA, 2001d). 
Significantly, the Koizumi government revised the 1992 PKO Law on 14 December 
2001 to make SDF’s participation in PKF possible (Cabinet Office Japan, 2001). In February 
2002, in response to strong requests and expectations from the United Nations and the leaders 
of East Timor, the Japanese government decided to dispatch 680 Ground Self Defense Force 
(GSDF) personnel in engineer units and 10 PKF headquarters personnel to peace operations 
conducted by UNTAET (MOFA, 2001e, 2002a; Cabinet Office Japan, 2002-2004). In 
response to a further request from the United Nations, the Japanese government decided to 
dispatch eight electoral observers to the Presidential Election to be held on 14 April 2002 in 
East Timor (MOFA, 2002b). In the same month (29 April), Prime Minister Jun’ichirō 
Koizumi visited East Timor to inspect an SDF engineer unit serving in UNTAET (MOFA, 
2002c). For Japan, participation in UNTAET, the Constituent Assembly Elections, and the 
Presidential Election without casualties was a symbol of success. If SDF personnel had been 
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killed, the Japanese government would have had to consider the withdrawal of the SDF. 
Moreover, the UNTAET operation itself was generally successful (Ishizuka, 2008, pp. 132-
133). 
Stage 4: Peacebuilding: Japan’s Contribution to Post-independence Operations 
In the fourth stage of the peace operation (peacebuilding), Japan, on the basis of its 
“human security” policy, maximized its contribution to the peace operation in East Timor. 
UNMISET, under the leadership of SRSG Sukehiko Hasegawa from Japan, can be 
categorized as a post-conflict peacebuilding operation. Based on new diplomatic concepts 
such as “human security” and the “consolidation of peace”, the Japanese government 
dispatched a total of 2,300 SDF personnel to East Timor. In addition to UNMISET, Japan 
made a contribution to the subsequent UN peacebuilding operations in East Timor. East 
Timor gained independence from Indonesia on 20 May 2002 and UNTAET was replaced by 
UNMISET based on UNSC Resolution 1410 (United Nations, 2005a). The deployment of up 
to 5,000 military personnel, including 120 military observers, and 1,250 civilian police 
officers, was authorized based on the UNSC resolution (United Nations, 2005b). 
The independence of East Timor allowed Japanese peacekeepers to play a greater 
role. The Koizumi government decided at a Cabinet meeting to reassign a Japan GSDF 
Engineer Unit of 680 members (including seven female personnel) and PKF headquarters 
personnel, all of whom had been dispatched to UNTAET, for the post- independence nation-
building operations of UNMISET (MOFA, 2002d). The JDA organised 295 vehicles for the 
GSDF, two fleets for transportation and escort for the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF), 
and seven C-130H transportation aircrafts and a U-4 multifunctional support aircraft for the 
ASDF. The SDF was stationed in main cities, such as Dili, Maliana, Suai, and Oecusse (Pante 
Macassar), to construct roads and bridges and to offer support with water and food supplies in 
collaboration with the Korean forces (JDA, 2002, pp. 214-218; JDA, 2003a, p. 215; JDA, 
2003b, p.12). 
Japan’s commitment to peacebuilding operations in East Timor gradually decreased 
as the UNMISET mission was carried out. The changeover of Japanese peacekeepers was 
conducted in the presence of Toshio Kojima, Parliamentary Secretary for the JDA, on 13 
March 2002. Responding to a request from the United Nations, the SDF Engineer Unit was 
reduced from 680 personnel to 522 (MOFA, 2003a). On June 14 2002 in New York, UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan announced the appointment of Sukehiro Hasegawa as Deputy 
Special Representative of the Secretary General and Deputy Head of Mission (MOFA, 
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2002e). The United Nations decided to extend the mandate of UNMISET in accordance with 
UNSC Resolution 1480 until 20 May 2004, and the Japanese government also prolonged the 
term of the GSDF engineer group and headquarters personnel operating in East Timor 
(MOFA, 2003b). In line with the gradual conclusion of UNMISET, the number of SDF 
troops was reduced from 522 to 405. Prime Minister Koizumi, in talks with East Timorese 
President Gusmao in Tokyo on 23 February 2004, promised to make a further contribution of 
approximately one million US dollars to East Timor (Prime Minister of Japan and His 
Cabinet, 2004a). 
After the mandate of UNMISET expired on 20 May 2004, the Koizumi government 
decided on the full withdrawal of the fourth SDF personnel. Even so, the mandate of 
UNMISET was extended from 20 May 2004 for a maximum of one year (MOFA, 2004a). 
The total number of SDF personnel dispatched to UNMISET amounted to approximately 
2,300 SDF troops, including 25 female personnel. The nation-building activities of the SDF 
consisted of 120 projects that included the maintenance and repair of roads, bridges and 
infrastructure, levelling land of the fields for elementary schools, and the construction of 
waste disposal facilities (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2004b). Through the Trust 
Fund for human security, the Japanese government decided to support the “100 Schools 
Project: Improving the Quality of Primary Education in East Timor” conducted by the United 
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) (MOFA, 2004b). 
Following the expiration of the mandate of UNMISET on 20 May 2005, the United 
Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), a UN special political mission, was established 
with a one-year mandate. In April 2006, ex-national army troops dropped out of the army as a 
result of discrimination and the demonstrations. The East Timorese government intervened 
with the national army, and approximately 100,000 people became IDPs, around 60% of the 
entire population of Dili. In response, the Japanese government decided to provide 
emergency contribution of US$5 million for an emergency shelter, water, and health care 
(MOFA, 2006a, 2006b). 
After the UNOTIL operation expired, UNSC Resolution 1704 authorized the 
establishment of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). 
Responding to a request from the United Nations, two Japanese civilian police officers were 
dispatched to UNMIT (Cabinet Office Japan, 2007). For presidential and parliamentary 
elections in East Timor, the Japanese government provided an emergency grant aid of 
US$723,855 though the UNDP and dispatched 14 electoral observers (MOFA, 2007a, 2007b, 
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2007c). In spite of all these peacebuilding activities, the security situation in East Timor was 
not stable and Australian Defense Forces remained until the security situation improved 
(MOFA, 2008). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the UN peace operations failed in East 
Timor. Japan did not stop its contribution to the peace operations and dispatched two 
peacekeepers for cease-fire monitoring operations to UNMIT in 2010. In response to the 
extension of the UNMIT mandate to 31 December 2012, the Japanese government also 
extended the duration of its commitment until 28 February 2013 so that Japan could make an 
extra commitment in case of an emergency (MOFA, 2010, 2012; United Nations, 2012). 
Discussion: Examined Data in the Sequence Analysis 
As clarified by the sequence analysis of Japan’s commitments to the peace operations 
in East Timor, although Japan could not make a direct military commitment to “national 
security” of East Timor through INTERFET, it donated US$100 million to the INTERFET 
operation, and continuous and substantial contributions were made by the Japanese 
government for “human security” of the East Timorese people as shown in Table 2 below 
(“PKO”, here, means general PKO missions regardless of stages).  
Table 2: Sequence of Japan’s Peace Operations for Human Security of East Timor 
Start of 
Operations 
Name of 
Operations and Details 
PKO  Humanitarian 
Relief 
Election 
Observation 
Contributions  
in kind, etc. 
June 1999 
(Stage 1) 
Contribution in kind to  
UNAMET  
(US$10.11 million to the UN 
Trust Fund)  
(2,000 radios) 
   o 
July 1999 
(Stage 1) 
International  
Peace Cooperation  
Assignment in East  
Timor (A political affairs officer 
and three civilian police officers) 
o    
Sep. 1999 
(Stage 2) 
 
INTERFET (US$100  
million)  
Emergency  
Humanitarian Assistance  
for East Timor  
(US$2 million)  
(US$1 million to  
UNHCR and WFP) 
  
 
o 
 o 
Oct. 1999 
(Stage 3) 
Contribution in kind to  
UNHCR for the Relief  
of East Timorese  
Displaced Persons 
   o 
Nov. 1999 
(Stage 3) 
International Peace  
Cooperation Assignment  
for East Timorese  
Displaced Persons (150  
ASDF) (500 tents, 9,000  
blankets, 11,140  
 o   
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sleeping mats,  
20,000 water containers,  
5,120 plastic sheets) 
Aug. 2001 
(Stage 3) 
International Peace  
Cooperation Assignment  
in East Timor 
(19 civilian election  
observers) 
(US$1,191,000 
through UNDP) 
  o  
Feb. 2002 
(Stage 4) 
 
International Peace  
Cooperation Assignment  
in East Timor 
(680 GSDF and 10 PKF to 
UNAMET) 
(2,300 GSDF in total to 
UNMISET) 
o    
Apr. 2002 
(Stage 4) 
 
International Peace  
Cooperation Assignment  
for East Timorese  
Election Observation 
  o  
May. 2004 
(Stage 4) 
100 Schools Project  
(UNICEF) 
   o 
June 2006 
(Stage 4) 
 
Emergency  
Humanitarian 
Assistance for  
East Timor 
(US$2 million) 
 o   
July 2006 
(Stage 4) 
Emergency Grant Aid  
through International  
Organizations for IDPs  
from Unrest in  
Timor-Leste 
 o   
Jan. 2007 
(Stage 4) 
International Peace  
Cooperation Assignment  
in Timor-Leste 
o    
Mar. 2007 
(Stage 4) 
International Peace  
Cooperation Assignment for 
Timor-Leste Election  
Observation  
(14 electoral observers  
and US$723,855  
through UNDP) 
  o  
Sep. 2010- 
Dec. 2012 
(Stage 4) 
International Peace  
Cooperation Assignment  
in Democratic Republic  
of Timor-Leste  
(2 peacekeepers  
for cease-fire monitoring to 
UNMIT) 
o    
 (Combined Data from Cabinet Office Japan, JDA, MOFA, and the United Nations) 
 
As the data displayed above demonstrate, Japan’s contribution to the peace 
operations, particularly dispatch of the peacekeepers to East Timor, became active after the 
Japanese government adopted the human security concept as a pillar of its diplomatic policy. 
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Simply, the sequence represents that Japan’s peace operations in East Timor were consistent 
and comprehensive for human security (freedom from fear and want). Moreover, as 
represented in Table 3, Japan was the third largest donor for peacebuilding in East Timor 
following Australia and Portugal (2005 and 2006). This fact means that Japan made 
significant contributions to human security of East Timor especially in terms of “freedom 
from want”. 
Table 3: Percentage of Top 3 Donors for Peacebuilding in East Timor (2005 and 2006) 
Name  
of  
Country 
Number  
of  
Donors 
Number 
of Donors  
over  
90% CPA 
% of CPA  
by  
Top  
Donor 
% of CPA  
by  
Top 2  
Donors 
% of CPA  
by  
Top 3  
Donors 
Total % of  
CPA  
by Top  
3 Donors 
East Timor 21 10 Australia 
(22%) 
Portugal 
(20%) 
Japan 
(15%) 
Total 
(57%) 
(OECD/DAC, 2008. p. 46) 
 
As well as the financial contribution (freedom from want), Japan made significant 
contributions to human security of East Timor in terms of maintenance of stability (freedom 
from fear). Normally, the Japanese government has focused on financial contributio ns as its 
human security policy, but the case of East Timor reveals that Japan’s human security policy 
has become more active and contributory to freedom from fear. Indeed, Japan’s peace 
operations in East Timor were more comprehensive and large-scale than those in Cambodia 
(Akimoto, 2012; Walton & Akimoto, 2013). This fact can be visualised by comparing the 
case of Japan’s peace operations in East Timor with the other peace operations conducted by 
Japanese peacekeepers as shown in Figure 1 below.  
Figure 1: Percentage of Japan’s Peace Operations for East Timor of Total Operations 
 
(Modified Data from Table 2 and Cabinet Office Japan) 
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As Figure 1 shows, the percentage of Japan’s commitment to peace operations in East 
Timor in comparison with the other operations is relatively high (31% in PKO, 50% in 
humanitarian relief, 33% in election observation, 19% in contributions in kind). Japan 
dispatched its peacekeepers to peace operations (PKO) in Cambodia, Mozambique, El 
Salvador, the Golan Heights, Nepal, Sudan, Haiti, and South Sudan, but the peace operations 
(PKO) in East Timor account for as many as 30% of the total. The figure, especially that of 
PKO, indicates that Japan’s peace operations in East Timor were more consistent, large-scale 
and comprehensive than the other peace operations conducted by the Japanese government 
for human security (particularly “freedom from fear”). 
In short, not only did Japan make financial and material contributions to “freedom 
from want” of the East Timorese, but the Japanese peacekeepers contributed to “freedom 
from fear” of the people as well. Although Japan could not make a military commitment to 
national security during the INTERFET operation, its contributions to human security of East 
Timor were seamless and comprehensive, including peace operations, humanitarian relief, 
election observation, and contributions in kind. Japan’s military and constitutional limitations 
could be overcome by cooperating with other countries, which are experienced in peace 
operations including peace-enforcement. In sum, the analysed data indicate the fact that Japan 
made holistic and consistent commitments to the peace operations for human security of East 
Timor. 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined Japan’s contributions to the four stages of peace operations 
in East Timor through the application of sequence analysis. By utilising the sequence analysis 
method, the complexity of the multi-dimensional peace operations and Japan’s contributions 
in East Timor has been clarified. As demonstrated by the data supplied in Table 2 and 3, as 
well as Figure 1, Japan has made long-term and large-scale contributions to the peace 
operations in East Timor. 
In the post-Cold War period, Japan explored making contributions to UN-authorized 
peace operations in East Timor. Japan’s first contribution was made to UNAMET as 
“preventive deployment”. Japan dispatched a political affairs officer and three civilian police 
officers and made a substantial material contribution to UNAMET. Nonetheless, as a result of 
the 1999 ballot, an armed conflict broke out and approximately one-fourth of the East 
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Timorese population became refugees. This period represents a culmination of “conflict 
escalation” (Glasl, 1982). 
The armed conflict in East Timor necessitated military intervention by INTERFET, as 
“peace-enforcement” for the sake of “conflict containment” (Ramsbotham, et al., 2005). 
Australian-led multinational forces contributed to peace-enforcement as part of the 
peacemaking process. Although the multinational forces were not a formal UN force, their 
military operations were authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1264. While Japan 
could not make a direct military contribution to “national security” of East Timor, owing to 
Article 9 of the Peace Constitution, it did make a financial contribution to INTERFET, 
UNHCR, and the WFP. 
The mandate of UNTAET as a peacekeeping operation included peace-enforcement 
based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Therefore, in 1999 Japan dispatched the SDF not to 
East Timor but to Indonesia and West Timor in order to support UNHCR. During the 
UNTAET operation, Japan made humanitarian and legal contributions. Indeed, HAER, one 
of the three pillars of UNTAET, was carried out under the leadership of Akira Takahashi. In 
addition, electoral observers were dispatched to the Constituent Assembly Elections in 2001. 
Finally, in February 2002, 680 Japanese peacekeepers and 10 PKF headquarters personnel 
were deployed to UNTAET. The Japanese government revised the PKO Law in order to 
dispatch the SDF to peace operations during the “conflict termination” period (Lund, 1996). 
In consequence of UNTAET, the Koizumi government sent more peacekeepers to 
UNMISET as a peacebuilding operation led by SRSG Sukehiko Hasegawa. On the basis of 
diplomatic concepts such as “human security” and the “consolidation of peace”, Japan 
dispatched about a total of 2,300 peacekeepers to UNMISET, which was the largest number 
in the history of Japan’s PKO policy. Furthermore, Japan has continued supporting post-
independence peacebuilding operations, such as UNOTIL and UNMIT. Those UN peace 
operations literally involved “state-building” as a part of peacebuilding operations (Paris & 
Sisk, 2009). Thus, although it seems to be relatively simplistic, the sequence analysis method 
has contributed to clarifying the complicated Japan’s peace missions. In conclusion, the 
findings discovered by sequence analysis substantiate that Japan’s contributions to peace 
operations in East Timor were incremental, seamless, and comprehensive despite the 
technical limitations. 
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